Retaining the Crown in the Face of Refugee Crises: King Abdullah II by Laymoun, Kevin
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate
Journal of History, Series II
Volume 18 Article 14
2013
Retaining the Crown in the Face of Refugee Crises:
King Abdullah II
Kevin Laymoun
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives
Part of the History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Historical
Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information,
please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laymoun, Kevin (2013) "Retaining the Crown in the Face of Refugee Crises: King Abdullah II," Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara
University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II: Vol. 18 , Article 14.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol18/iss1/14
Retaining the Crown 195
Retaining the Crown in the Face of
Refugee Crises: King Abdullah II
Kevin Laymoun
On the morning of May 14, 2011, hours after the
first reported rockets had been fired in Talkalakh,
Syria, thousands of Syrians flooded into neighboring
countries to escape what would become one of the
bloodiest civil wars of the twenty-first century. In the
midst of its own political turmoil, the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan was a target destination for many
of those fleeing the conflict in Syria. By early 2013, the
number of Syrian refugees in Jordan had climbed to
252,706, with 36,000 entering between January and
early February.1 With Jordan hosting preexisting
Palestinian and Iraqi refugee populations, the addition
of a third group, the Syrians, highlights the country’s
continued struggles with its role as a refugee state, as
well as the challenges of balancing the needs and
expectations of three different groups of displaced
people. 
Jordan’s central location in the Middle East has
made it the target destination for those fleeing troubles
in neighboring countries. The Israeli occupation, U.S.-
led war in Iraq, and Syrian civil war have forced
refugees from differing societal, cultural, and economic
backgrounds to cohabit the same land.2 The complex
      1 “Syrian Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR, February 12,
2013.
      2 Ilan Pappe, Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (n.p.: Oneworld,
2007). and Joseph Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis
in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris), 2009. and
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relationships that have arisen out of this unique
situation have resulted in a clash of cultures and
rights, as each group struggles with its own issues of
identity. Amid the myriad issues surrounding the
refugees in Jordan lies one important additional issue:
the role of the country’s ruler, King Abdullah II, who
has struggled to maintain a national identity for a
country whose citizens are greatly outnumbered by
refugee populations. This paper argues that given the
recent arrival of the Syrian refugees and the historic
nationalist, economic, religious, and political tensions
caused by the preexisting Palestinian and Iraqi
populations, King Abdullah II’s past usage of his tribal
power base, parliamentary control, and the
Mukhabarat — secret police force, are the tactics he
will again employ in dealing with the three-part refugee
complexity. His main goal, in all of this, is to promote
Hashemite rule. To understand King Abdullah’s
approach to the Syrian refugee crisis, it is essential to
first examine the challenges posed to Jordanian
nationalism by the arrival of the Palestinian and Iraqi
populations, and the King’s methods for dealing with
these crises.  
This paper builds on the work chronicling the
experiences of both the Palestinian and Iraqi refugees
in Jordan, and applies it to an understanding of the
unfolding Syrian refugee situation. Since it assumed
responsibility for the West Bank territories at the Arab
League conference of 1948, the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan has been home to thousands of Palestinian
“Syria—Uprising and Civil War,” New York Times, accessed
February 13, 2013.
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refugees.3 According to Rex Honey and Jim A. Wilson,
Palestinian-Jordanian refugees are unique due to their
presence in Jordan since its birth as a state, which
resulted in their receiving citizenship.4 Honey and
Wilson explain that the displacement of thousands of
Palestinians from Palestine with the creation of the
state of Israel led to both the creation of modern
Jordan as well as to a short-term solution to the
Palestinian refugee crisis.5 The denial of the right to
return by Israel forced many Palestinians to remain in
Jordan permanently despite their desire to return
home.6 As a result, the Palestinian population in
Jordan, despite having Jordanian citizenship, still
identifies itself as Palestinian, and desires a return to
their original homeland.7 The Palestinian case of quasi-
permanent refugee status in Jordan will be contrasted
with the case of the more recent, and, perhaps less-
permanent, Iraqi and Syrian refugees. Historical
sources and media accounts discussing the
Palestinian experience in Jordan will be used to build
an understanding of the issues this refugee group has
posed and continue to pose for the King.   
The Iraqi example is particularly helpful in
analyzing the tactics the King used in dealing with
refugees in Jordan. Sassoon provides the most
      3 Oroub Al Abed, “Palestinian refugees in Jordan,” FMO,
(2004).
      4 Rex Honey and Jim A. Wilson, "Planning in Jordan: Coping
with Uncertainty," GeoJournal 37, no. 1 (September 1995): [134],
accessed January 22, 2013, JSTOR.
            5 Ibid,.
      6 Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B.
Tauris, 1998), 165.
      7 Ibid., 166.
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comprehensive report on the Iraqi experience in
Jordan, especially of the negative reactions towards
this refugee group by both Palestinians and the native
Jordanians, also referred to in this paper as
Transjordanians. The difference between these two
latter groups will be discussed later. Sassoon identifies
differences between Palestinian and Iraqi refugee
situations, namely the difficulty in accurately
assessing the Iraqi population: “What makes the Iraqi
refugee crisis unique is the fact that many of the
refugees were urban, educated middle class who fled
to large urban areas, making it extremely difficult for
humanitarian agencies to provide the right services
and to collate accurate information from an ‘invisible’
refugee population.”8
In accounting for the lack of self-disclosure by
many unregistered Iraqis, Sassoon offers a more
accurate context in which to examine the facts and
figures reported by Jordanian officials and NGOs.9
Sassoon also explains some similarities shared by the
Iraqis and Palestinians, namely that the Palestinians’
failure to return home has made Jordan wary of what
might become of the Iraqis.10  His resourceful use of
barometric tools, such as interviews of Amman’s taxi
drivers, are employed effectively to gauge political and
cultural sentiment, and to explain the tensions
existing between Iraqi refugees and their host
country.11 Since Sassoon released his book in 2009,
the demographic data has changed, but updated
      8 Joseph Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the
Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 5.
      9  Ibid., 43.
      10 Ibid., 6.
      11 Ibid., 55.
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figures regarding refugee registration, average
household income, and the number of Iraqi refugees in
Jordan are available from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).12 Along with
other scholarly sources and opinion pieces, Sassoon’s
cultural observations regarding Iraqi refugees in
Jordan offers insight into the challenges that Iraqi
refugees pose to King Abdullah’s nationalist agenda.  
Because the introduction of the Syrian refugee
population to Jordan is so recent, a comprehensive
analysis of the group has yet to emerge. As the Syrian
refugee experience unfolds, UNHCR reports, op-ed
pieces, and media accounts will provide a varied
account of the emerging issues and problems that
accompany yet another refugee group to Jordan. 
The Monarchy and Refugees
Before examining the issue of refugee arrival in
Jordan, it is important to understand the definition of
a refugee used in this paper. The term “refugee” is
often employed as a blanket-term in reference to all
manner of displaced people, but this general
application of the term distorts the scope of the
discussion. According to the UNHCR, a refugee is a
person “who has been forced to leave his or her
country because of persecution, war, or violence.”13
      12 "Jordan: 2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile," United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last modified 2013,
accessed March 19, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486566&submit=GO.
      13 “What is a Refugee?," UNHCR, last modified 2013,
accessed March 19, 2013,
http://www.unrefugees.org/site/c.lfIQKSOwFqG/b.4950731/k.
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This definition is useful in understanding the common
usage of the term refugee. Moreover, Article 1 of the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees offers a legal definition: 
[The term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person
who] owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.14
While the parties discussed in this paper do not
universally accept this definition, to avoid the
confusion that accompanies such a debate, the term
refugee will be used here to refer to the groups of
people who were, for whatever reason, compelled to
leave their native country and settle in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. Apart from providing a legal
definition for the term refugee, the UN Convention of
1951 outlined both the rights and obligations of the
host state as part of its agreement. The states that
signed the 1951 agreement acknowledged a set of
A894/What_is_a_refugee.htm.
      14 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution




Laymoun: Retaining the Crown in the Face of Refugee Crises
Published by Scholar Commons, 2013
Retaining the Crown 199
figures regarding refugee registration, average
household income, and the number of Iraqi refugees in
Jordan are available from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).12 Along with
other scholarly sources and opinion pieces, Sassoon’s
cultural observations regarding Iraqi refugees in
Jordan offers insight into the challenges that Iraqi
refugees pose to King Abdullah’s nationalist agenda.  
Because the introduction of the Syrian refugee
population to Jordan is so recent, a comprehensive
analysis of the group has yet to emerge. As the Syrian
refugee experience unfolds, UNHCR reports, op-ed
pieces, and media accounts will provide a varied
account of the emerging issues and problems that
accompany yet another refugee group to Jordan. 
The Monarchy and Refugees
Before examining the issue of refugee arrival in
Jordan, it is important to understand the definition of
a refugee used in this paper. The term “refugee” is
often employed as a blanket-term in reference to all
manner of displaced people, but this general
application of the term distorts the scope of the
discussion. According to the UNHCR, a refugee is a
person “who has been forced to leave his or her
country because of persecution, war, or violence.”13
      12 "Jordan: 2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile," United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last modified 2013,
accessed March 19, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486566&submit=GO.
      13 “What is a Refugee?," UNHCR, last modified 2013,
accessed March 19, 2013,
http://www.unrefugees.org/site/c.lfIQKSOwFqG/b.4950731/k.
200 Historical Perspectives June 2013
This definition is useful in understanding the common
usage of the term refugee. Moreover, Article 1 of the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees offers a legal definition: 
[The term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person
who] owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.14
While the parties discussed in this paper do not
universally accept this definition, to avoid the
confusion that accompanies such a debate, the term
refugee will be used here to refer to the groups of
people who were, for whatever reason, compelled to
leave their native country and settle in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. Apart from providing a legal
definition for the term refugee, the UN Convention of
1951 outlined both the rights and obligations of the
host state as part of its agreement. The states that
signed the 1951 agreement acknowledged a set of
A894/What_is_a_refugee.htm.
      14 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution




Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 18 [2013], Art. 14
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol18/iss1/14
Retaining the Crown 201
refugee rights that grant, among them, freedom of
religion, movement, the right to work, and accessibility
to travel documents. Most importantly, signatories
agreed to non-refoulement, or the principle of not
returning refugees to countries in which they fear
persecution.15 Jordan has refused to sign the
document and is not bound by its bylaws; this fact is
especially important as it reflects the country’s view of
its refugee population. 
Jordan characterizes any refugees residing in the
country as “guests” of the King and thus subject to any
treatment deemed suitable by the government.16
Adding to the terminological confusion, the majority of
Iraqis in Jordan reject the label of “refugee,” given its
connotations of helplessness. Instead, these groups
prefer the term “traveler.”17 The debate over
terminology dates back to the wave of Palestinian
refugees taken in by Jordan in 1948, who were viewed
as temporary citizens.18 However, the Palestinians were
never able to return to their native land. The
subsequent granting of full citizenship rights to this
refugee group transformed the ethnic balance of
Jordan. Consequently, it was the goal of King
Abdullah’s great grandfather to avoid another such
occurrence by renouncing any legal obligation towards
refugee groups.
Before discussing the history behind the ethnic and
national tensions within Jordanian society, it is
      15 Ibid.
      16 Mohamed Y. Owlan, “The Legal Framework of Forced
Migration,” American University in Cairo Egypt, October 23-25,
2007.
      17 Sassoon, The Iraq Refugees, 154.
      18 Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, 165.
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necessary to note first the nature of the country’s
leadership. Trans-Jordan began as a British mandate,
and then became the sovereign state of Jordan in April
1949, at which time King Abdullah I assumed the title
of King of Jordan.19 After his assassination in 1951,
Abdullah I’s son Talal promulgated a constitution on
January 1, 1952 that called for the creation of a
parliament and government, with the King acting as a
constitutional monarch.20 The constitution of 1952
remains the legal basis of the country, and it speaks to
the absolute authority of the King in Article 30: “The
King is the Head of State and is immune to any
liability and responsibility.”21 It is important to note
the level of control that belongs to the King within this
type of system: he selects both the Prime Minister and
the entire Senate. While the Senate is half the size of
the House of Representatives, while elected, both
houses need to have a two-thirds majority to over-rule
the King’s veto power. Moreover, the House of
Representatives, while elected, has been skewed to
reflect greater representation amongst the districts
with tribal allegiance to the King’s Hashemite clan,
thus awarding the King almost total control over
governmental and legislative affairs.22 The issues of
political control will be addressed in greater depth later
in this paper. The extent to which the King influences
policy and government affairs under the Jordanian
      19 Ibid., 153.
      20 Ibid., 178.
      21 "The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
January 1, 1952," The Library, accessed March 19, 2013,
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html.
      22 Curtis Ryan, "Reform Retreats Amid Jordan's Political
Storms," Middle East Report, June 10, 2005.
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legal system parallels the tactics used to manage the
refugee populations as well, and reflects the will of
King Abdullah II.
The Palestinian Example
The problems that Palestinian refugees pose to
Jordan are based in the history of the relationship
between the refugee group and the state. As noted
above, the Palestinians arrived in the West Bank in
1948 following the Al-Nakba, or catastrophe, in which
the Israeli Army occupied villages across what was
known as Palestine, forcing roughly 700,000
Palestinians to flee.23 Once Trans-Jordan annexed the
West Bank in 1950, the Palestinian refugees living in
that region gained full citizenship as part of a deal that
King Abdullah I made with Palestinian ministers in
return for guardianship of East Jerusalem.24 Following
the 1967 War, Israel occupied the West Bank, forcing
thousands of Palestinians into the East Bank and what
is today modern Jordan. With the influx of roughly
400,000 more Palestinians into the East Bank,
Palestinians constituted more than half of Jordan’s
population after 1967.25 
One result of the 1967 War was the emergence of
the fedayeen, a group of Palestinian resistance fighters
living in Jordan. The fedayeen fought the Israeli
      23 "United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine,"




      24 Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, 165. 
      25 Ibid., 3, 224.
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occupying forces from border towns, but were based in
Irbid, a town in the north of Jordan.26 While King
Hussein, King Abdullah II’s father, was pressed by the
Arab countries to militarily back the Palestinian
resistance fighters, he feared that his involvement
might provoke the Israeli Army to invade his country.
Several battles took place between the fedayeen and
the Israeli Army, most notably the Battle of Karameh,
in which Israeli forces crossed into Jordan and clashed
with Jordanian and fedayeen troops. By mid-1970,
King Hussein feared he had lost control of his country
as the fedayeen began operating as “a state within a
state.” In an effort to reaffirm control of his country,
King Hussein ordered an all-out assault on the
fedayeen in the country. King Hussein and the
Jordanian Armed Forces eventually won the civil war
known as “Black September,” but the bloody events
left a deep cultural resentment between
“Transjordanians,” or native Jordanians, and
Palestinian-Jordanians.27 Salibi explains that events
like Black September prove that the Palestinians’
continued devotion, both perceived and real, to their
native Palestine has often put them at odds with the
nationalist-minded monarchy and Bedouin tribes that
make up the population of indigenous Jordanians.28 
The events of Black September highlighted the
emergence of two major positions taken by King
Hussein. The first was the King’s political and military
reliance on the rural Bedouin tribes that both
      26 Ibid., 186.
      27 Ibid., 237.
      28 Mudar Zahran, “Jordan Is Palestine,” Middle East
Quarterly, (Winter 2012): 3-12.
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make up the population of indigenous Jordanians.28 
The events of Black September highlighted the
emergence of two major positions taken by King
Hussein. The first was the King’s political and military
reliance on the rural Bedouin tribes that both
      26 Ibid., 186.
      27 Ibid., 237.
      28 Mudar Zahran, “Jordan Is Palestine,” Middle East
Quarterly, (Winter 2012): 3-12.
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supported and fought for his regime against the
Palestinian resistance. The second was the enduring
skepticism with which the King viewed Palestinians, a
view that manifests itself in his political
marginalization of the group.
Black September and the policy shifts it produced
under King Hussein were passed to King Abdullah II
when he inherited the throne in 1999, and are evident
in the latter’s dealings with the Palestinian population
since then. In October 2000, on the heels of the second
Intifada—the collective uprising of the Palestinians
under Israeli occupation—protests broke out in
Amman and other parts of Jordan in support of the
Palestinian cause. King Abdullah responded by
suspending Parliament on June 13, 2001, ahead of the
scheduled elections, and implementing 125
“temporary” laws aimed at quelling political dissent.29
One such law made it illegal to criticize “friendly
nations,” a law that, as a result of Jordan’s 1994 treaty
with Israel, clearly targeted the groups protesting the
Jordanian government’s lack of support for the second
Intifada.30 As his late father had done, King Abdullah
treated the largely Palestinian protestors with
considerable hostility, and moved quickly to quash any
would-be movements that might run counter to
Jordanian nationalist interests. 
To this day tensions remain high, as Palestinians
have increasingly come to resent the measures taken
by the King to diminish their impact on Jordanian
      29 Jillian Schwedler, “More than a Mob: The Dynamic of
Political Demonstrations in Jordan,” Middle East Research and
Information Project 226 (2003): 19.
      30 Ibid., 20.
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affairs. Mudar Zahran characterizes the Palestinian
population in Jordan as a “ticking bomb” that is
resentful of its lack of representation in Parliament
despite representing a majority of the population.31 In
his article on Jordanian political reform, Greenwood
argues that electoral laws passed by the crown serve to
engender support amongst its most important
constituent: “[The] House of Hashim has sought to
reward its Transjordanian supporters with public jobs
and subsidies […] these efforts [have] given
Transjordanians a greater voice in local and national
politics […and] have also enabled East Bank tribes and
clans to secure more public jobs, spending, and
services […].”32 
The Palestinian refugee population protested their
political marginalization under King Hussein even after
they gained some representation in Parliament under
laws passed by the previous regime. King Abdullah,
during the period when he suspended Parliament in
2001, passed an electoral law that, “like the old law,
[…] continues to rely on the principle of ‘one person,
one vote’ and also over-represents the rural areas
heavily populated by Transjordanians.”33 By granting
more representatives to a larger number of rural
districts, King Abdullah effectively nullified any
Palestinian representation in Parliament. Recent
evidence of King Abdullah’s commitment to the
      31 Mudar Zahran, "Jordan is Palestine," The Middle East
Quarterly 19 (Winter 2012): accessed March 19, 2013,
http://www.meforum.org/3121/jordan-is-palestinian.
      32 Scott Greenwood, "Jordan’s ‘New Bargain:’ The Political
Economy of Regime Security," Middle East Journal 57 (Spring
2003): 252-259, accessed March 19, 2013, JSTOR.
      33 Ibid., 264.
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maintenance of a controlled Palestinian population is
that he instructed officials to reject Palestinian
refugees at the border who were fleeing the Syrian
conflict so as to not add to the current imbalance of
Palestinian and Transjordanians in the country, a
move that could tip the balance of power.34
In addition to the political tensions, ethnic conflict
between Palestinian and Transjordanian groups have
been sources of concern for the King. King Abdullah’s
wife, Queen Rania, is a Palestinian and has recently
been the target of insults by Bedouin groups who
protest her inclusion in the royal family.35 Largely
driven by the lingering effects of Black September,
many Transjordanians see her position of authority as
a justification of their fears that Palestinians are
gaining too much power in the Kingdom. 
Serving as an example for the Transjordanian
skepticism of Jordan’s Palestinian population are the
King’s exclusionary edicts regarding Palestinian
involvement in the Jordanian government, army, and
Mukhabarat. The government is comprised primarily of
Transjordanians, who, for both tribal-lineage and self-
serving reasons, are fiercely loyal to the crown. The
Transjordanian population, which is largely rural and
Bedouin, resents Palestinians for their devotion to the
      34 Ruth Eglash, "'Jordan rejecting Palestinian refugees from
Syria,'" The Jerusalem Post (Israel), July 4, 2012, accessed
March 19, 2013,
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=276261.
      35 Ian Black, "Queen Rania Still in Shadows as Jordan Plays
Waiting Game," The Guardian (Amman, Jordan), May 11, 2012,
accessed March 19, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/11/queen-rania-
jordan-waiting-game.
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retrieval of their lost state, but also for their dominant
position in the private business sector. Laszlo
Csicsmann characterizes the King’s apprehensions
towards the Palestinian population: 
The private sector of the Jordanian economy is
dominated by Palestinians […]. The main
dilemma for the Hashemite dynasty is to decide
whether the Palestinians will support the status
quo, vis-à-vis the regime or will challenge the
legitimacy of the current system by using their
economic assets.36
The King’s distrust of the economically viable
Palestinian population, coupled with the
Transjordanian need for economic support, has
created a symbiotic relationship with the
Transjordanian population in which the King receives
legitimacy and support in return for granting native
Jordanians exclusive privilege to government jobs and
political posts. A key element in this relationship is the
Jordanian Army, which is completely Transjordanian,
since the army’s total allegiance to the King is
essential to the security of his regime.37 The practice of
maintaining a Bedouin army with no Palestinian
membership reflects the lingering trepidation left from
the events of Black September. However, apart from
providing insurance against any would-be Palestinian
military coup, the exclusion of Palestinians from the
      36 Laszlo Csicsmann, "Responsible Freedom and National
Security," Society and Economy 29, no. 1 (April 2007): 108,
accessed March 20, 2013, JSTOR.
      37Zahran, "Jordan Is Palestine."
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army also serves to economically marginalize the
refugee population, as some of the country’s highest
salaries and greatest benefits are reserved for members
of the army.38 
The Jordanian Mukhabarat represent another
resource that is invaluable to the King in controlling
dissidents in his kingdom. Like the army, the agency’s
membership is exclusively Transjordanian. The
Mukhabarat is one of the largest intelligence programs
in the world in relation to its country’s total
population.39 Notoriously brutal, the Mukhabarat
enforce King Abdullah’s rule at the street level by
using an intricate and extensive network of
informants; it also collaborates with foreign
intelligence agencies to squelch any subversive
movements.40 The influence of the Mukhabarat must
not be overlooked: besides providing intelligence, the
agency plays a key role in elections and public
discourse. Mahmoud A. al-Kharabesheh, a former
director of the Mukhabarat, explains: “Some
Parliament members allow the mukhabarat [sic] to
intervene in how they vote because they depend on
them for help in getting re-elected.”41 The former
      38 "Assessment for Palestinians in Jordan," Minorities at




      39Zahran, “Jordan Is Palestine.”
      40 Neil MacFarquhar, "Heavy Hand of Secret Police Impeding
Reform in Arab World," New York Times (Amman, Jordan),
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director also notes that the agency is involved in “90
percent” of the political affairs of the country.
Furthermore, the Mukhabarat functions to deter
discourse that is critical of the King by imprisoning
anyone who makes comments deemed unacceptable to
the crown.42 The hard line that the Mukhabarat take
on criticism of the crown or national policies has been
enforced thoroughly, as seen in the many instances of
Jordanians being whisked away for questioning
regarding remarks they have made or areas they have
visited.43 
With each challenge that the Palestinian refugees
have posed to Jordanian nationalism and the authority
of the Hashemite crown, King Abdullah, like his late
father, has relied on his Transjordanian constituency’s
roles in the government, army, and Mukhabarat to
promote allegiance to Jordan, and simultaneously his
legitimacy as king. 
The Iraqi Example
On the heels of the 2003 United States invasion of
Iraq, thousands of Iraqis flooded into Jordan, adding
to the complexities of Jordanian society. Though he
supported the US “war on terror” in Afghanistan, King
Abdullah faced a difficult diplomatic circumstance
posed by a US war with Iraq. Torn between his strong
dependence on US aid to his country and a large
domestic sympathy for Iraq, King Abdullah was once
      42 "'A Sad Day for Freedom of Expression,'" Al-Ahram Weekly
(Cairo, Egypt), May 23, 2002, 587th edition, accessed March 20,
2013, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/587/re7.htm.
      43 MacFarquhar, "Heavy Hand of Secret."
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again challenged to maintain control of his country
amidst the public’s disapproval of his diplomatic
stances on regional issues. With the US promising an
additional $150 million on top of the annual $460
million military and economic aid it already gave to
Jordan, in return for support of its invasion of Iraq,
King Abdullah pledged his cooperation, and began a
campaign to combat public disapproval by
emphasizing a focus on domestic issues to draw
attention away from his foreign policy.44 
Like the rest of the world, King Abdullah did not
anticipate the fallout of the US invasion of Iraq,
particularly the impact caused to Jordan by the mass
of refugees fleeing from the war zone. The number of
Iraqis and their standard of living are areas of great
debate due to the glaring lack of self-disclosure by
many Iraqi refugees in Jordan.45 Figures have been
provided by government-contracted research
institutions and international humanitarian agencies,
although these figures become less helpful once it is
recognized that the sample pool, which will be
discussed below, is largely unrepresentative of
Jordan’s Iraqi refugee population as a whole. 
To fully grasp the Iraqi refugee situation in Jordan
one must make the distinction between two waves of
Iraqi refugees. Despite a number of political dissenters
and exiled persons fleeing to Jordan prior to the US
invasion, the first wave, which arrived shortly after the
      44 Anthony Shadid, "Jordan to Allow Limited Stationing of
US Troops," Washington Post (Amman, Jordan), January 30,
2003, A10. And Jamal Halaby, "Diplomats: Jordan to OK
Airspace Use," Washington Post (Amman, Jordan), January 30,
2003.
      45 Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugee, 37.
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2003 invasion, was comprised mostly of upper-class
businessmen and government officials who were
labeled as “Mercedes refugees” by the diplomatic
community, and were able to make a comfortable
living for themselves in Jordanian cities.46 A second
larger wave came in 2005 and was made up of poorer
Iraqis fleeing the sectarian violence.47 
The most comprehensive survey of Iraqi refugees in
Jordan was published in 2007 by Fafo, a Norwegian
research company, and contains some inconsistencies
that reflect a lack of information regarding the
disadvantaged majority of Iraqi refugees in Jordan.
Sassoon explains the problematic nature of the Fafo
figures: “Fafo found that among those Iraqis surveyed,
56 percent had valid permits. If it was a representative
sample, this would translate into at least 250,000
Iraqis having legal status in Jordan, and by the time of
Fafo’s survey that was definitely not the case.”48
Sassoon goes on to explain that the sample group
targeted in the survey favors those “less vulnerable
and with the right legal status,” as refugees without
permits and little to gain from answering survey
questions from agencies with no power to help them
out. Updated figures provided by UNHCR are available,
but it is important to recognize the sample group when
      46 Congressional Research Service, Iraqi Refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian
Crisis?, Doc. No. 7-5700, at 7 (2009).
      47 Ibid.
      48 Iraqis in Jordan Their Number and Characteristics
(Amman, Jordan: FAFO, 2007), accessed March 20, 2013,
http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_a/main/Analasis_Reports/Ira
qis%20in%20Jordan/Iraqis%20in%20Jordan.pdf and Sassoon,
The Iraqi Refugee, 37.
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interpreting any figures. According to the UNHCR and
Jordanian government figures as of January 2012,
450,500 Iraqi refugees reside in Jordan, and 29,000 of
those are assisted by the NHCR.49 
The arrival of Iraqis has led to a number of tensions
within the Hashemite Kingdom. The first wave of rich
Iraqis began to entrench themselves in the Jordanian
economy by buying homes, thus causing housing
prices to rise.50 The second wave of very poor Iraqis is
regarded as having increased the number of “black
market jobs” that have undercut many Jordanians’
wages.51 Regardless of their culpability for the rise in
inflation, which Sassoon discusses as possibly
misplaced blame, the Iraqi refugees have been singled
out in the press as the cause for the sagging Jordanian
economy.52 
Additionally, many Jordanians feared that the
sectarian violence plaguing Iraq would follow the Iraqi
refugees into Jordan. Iraq hosts three clashing groups:
Shia, Sunni, and Kurds. The Shia and Sunnis are two
Islamic sects that have fought with each other for
hundreds of years over ideological differences
regarding the Islamic faith. Jordan historically had
      49 "Jordan: 2013 UNHCR Country," United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
      50 Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugee, 49.
      51 "IRAQ-JORDAN: Iraqis Cause Black Market for Jobs,"
IRIN, last modified March 28, 2007, accessed March 20, 2013,
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/71004/IRAQ-JORDAN-Iraqis-
cause-black-market-for-jobs.
      52 Ibid. and Ibrahim Saif and David M. DeBartolo, The Iraq
War’s Impact on Growth and Inflation in Jordan (Amman,
Jordan: University of Jordan Center for Strategic Studies, 2007),
accessed March 20, 2013,
http://www.carim.org/public/polsoctexts/PS2JOR028_EN.pdf.
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very few Shias (about 15.6 percent of the Muslim
population), and feared that an influx of them into the
country would cause problems with its Sunni
majority.53 Seen as a growing threat to his control,
King Abdullah warned that the arrival of Shias in
Jordan could be part of a larger subversive movement
by Iran to gain control in the region.54 The Mukahbarat
eventually began targeting Iraqi Shias for expulsion
from the Kingdom.55 Chatelard explains that the
Jordanian government’s encouragement of the public’s
skepticism of Iraqi Shias affected the entire Iraqi
refugee population and helped them become labeled as
guhraba (strangers).56 The branding of the Iraqis as the
“other” helped to isolate and so frustrate any political
aspirations the refugee group might have.  
Another source of animosity felt towards the Iraqi
refugees stems from the precedent set by the
Palestinian refugee group. Palestinians were
universally welcomed into Jordan as they were viewed
      53 Iraqis in Jordan Their, 6.
      54 Peter Baker and Robin Wright, "Iraq, Jordan See Threat To
Election From Iran," Washington Post, December 8, 2004, A01,
accessed March 20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html.
      55 World Refugee Survey 2007 (n.p.: US Committee for






      56 Geraldine Chatelard, Iraqi Forced Migrants in Jordan:
Conditions, Religious Networks, and the Smuggling Process
(Florence, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute, 2002), 14-15, accessed March 20,
2013, http://www.aina.org/articles/chatelard.pdf.
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as victims of the unprovoked aggression of Israel; but
the immovability of the Palestinian refugee population
has made Jordanians wary of what might happen with
the Iraqi situation.57 This fear was confirmed by a
UNHCR report in 2009 that revealed that a shocking
92 percent of Iraqi refugees in Jordan have no
intention of returning to Iraq.58 These figures were
especially worrisome given that a large portion of the
survey pool, 630 of the 1118 interviewed, may not have
been registered with the UNHCR. Given the
anonymous nature of the survey, these findings are
particularly important given their insight on previously
underreported segments of the Iraqi population in
Jordan. The report goes on to list the reasons offered
by participants for not wanting to return to Iraq.
However, most important is the reality that the Iraqi
refugee population continues, with each passing year,
to become a more permanent aspect of Jordanian
society. 
King Abdullah’s treatment of Iraqi refugees began
to resemble the treatment, decades earlier, of the
Palestinian population that experienced government-
approved alienation, little political involvement, heavy
censorship by the Mukabarat, and an obscuring of
their national heritage. King Abdullah, having learned
from both his father’s and his own experience with the
Palestinians, began to implement policies to manage
the arriving Iraqi refugees. By publicly blaming Iraqis
for economic and religious subversion, King Abdullah’s
      57 Ibid., 8.
      58 Summary: Intention to Return to Iraq Inquiries of 2008 &
2009 (Amman, Jordan: UNHCR, 2009), 1, accessed March 20,
2013, http://www.unhcr.org/4acb0e429.html.
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regime tried to mute any sympathy for Iraqi refugees
by encouraging discrimination against Iraqis across
economic, racial, and religious grounds. 
It is difficult to reconcile Jordan’s harsh treatment
of its refugee populations with its history of willingness
to host displaced peoples. One explanation can be
found in the Fafo report. Earlier, the Fafo report was
shown to reflect embellished figures regarding the Iraqi
refugees in Jordan, but the nature of the report is
more problematic because the Jordanian government
contracted Fafo and then delayed publication of its
findings for six months to negotiate the final figures.59
One diplomat indicated that the delay was to adjust
the figures with the ultimate goal being to secure
greater aid for Jordan.60 The financial incentive offered
to countries that host refugee populations explains
King Abdullah’s willingness to accept refugees despite
the challenges they present to his Kingdom’s stability.
King Abdullah has long relied on Jordan’s non-
signatory status of the 1951 UN Convention as a
means to leverage his power over arriving refugees.
Unlike the Palestinian refugees who, under the
constitution, at least, are afforded rights of citizenship
and political participation, the post-2003 Iraqi refugees
enjoy no such benefits due to their lack of citizenship.
The likelihood of citizenship being granted to most
Iraqis remains fleeting, as the Jordanian government
      59 Patricia Weiss Fagen, Iraqi Refugees: Seeking Stability in
Syria and Jordan (n.p.: Institute for the Study of International
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continues to deny them rights granted to refugees
under the 1951 UN Convention, and characterizes the
group as “illegal immigrants.”61 
Having effectively neutralized Iraqi political activity
through the denial of citizenship or refugee rights,
King Abdullah has recognized the possibility of an Iraqi
backlash in the form of protest or violence. As was his
solution to the Palestinian problem, King Abdullah has
turned to his loyal Mukhabarat to monitor the Iraqis
and quell any possible Iraqi insurgency. One product
of this policy is to deny Iraqis the ability to congregate
in mass gatherings, with an exception being made for
funerals.62 A source of great consternation for many
middle class educated Iraqis who arrived in 2005 is the
low-level positions they are forced to take despite their
professional experience. Sassoon explains that many
engineers and doctors who were top specialists in their
fields in Iraq are being forced to work below their
qualifications and for meager pay.63 The preferential
treatment of Jordanians over many highly qualified
Iraqis is in line with the King’s assurance to his
Transjordanian constituents of financial reward in
return for their political support. 
Amidst growing turmoil over the 2000 Intifada, the
2001 suspension of Parliament, and the impending US
invasion of Iraq, King Abdullah launched the al-Urdun
Awwalan, or “Jordan First,” campaign. With turmoil in
the region at an all-time high, King Abdullah
embarked on a campaign to consolidate support for
Jordan, and his crown, by emphasizing Jordan’s own
      61 Ibid., 52.
      62 Ibid., 53.
      63 Ibid., 47.
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domestic problems over those of the Middle East
region. Greenwood explains that the purpose of the
Jordan First campaign was to quiet “domestic
challenges generated by regional political
developments.”64 The Jordan First constitution on the
Jordanian Royal website makes it clear that allegiance
to Jordan must come before religious, ethnic, and
other differences.65 King Abdullah’s maneuvering can
be best understood in terms of his highest priority,
which is to preserve his control over the Kingdom. The
purpose of the Jordan First campaign was to shift
Jordanian consciousness away from the King’s
unpopular position regarding Israel and the US, so
that he could continue to secure vital aid for domestic
socio-economic issues that appealed to the
underrepresented and marginalized groups of Jordan.
The economic project championed by Jordan First is
the Socio-Economic Transformation Plan (SETP). In
return for King Abdullah’s pledge of support, and to
ensure the success of his domestic campaign, the US
pledged a total of $395.5 million in the first two years
of SETP.66 Though Greenwood notes that Jordan First
failed to truly deliver improvement to the Iraqis or
Palestinians, “the vast majority of this new spending
was to take place in rural areas where most of the
regime’s Transjordanian political base resides.”67 In
      64 Greenwood, "Jordan’s ‘New Bargain:’ The Political," 265.
      65 Jordan Armed Forces, last modified 2010, accessed March
20, 2013, http://jaf.mil.jo/Ar/History.aspx?CategoryID=7.
      66 "JORDAN: $145.5 MILLION OF US GRANT EXTENDED TO
SETP," Jordan Times (Amman, Jordan), January 27, 2003, [Page
#], accessed March 20, 2013,
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-96897273.html.
      67 Greenwood, "Jordan’s ‘New Bargain:’ The Political," 266.
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2005 a probe into the expenditures of SETP launched
a controversy, the result of which the King ultimately
ordered the program closed so as to avoid further
unrest.68 Despite the major questions surrounding its
central financial policy, the Jordan First campaign
remains a central message of King Abdullah’s regime,
as he continues to stress devotion to his throne above
all else.
Implications for Syrian Refugees
Having discussed King Abdullah’s past responses
to the challenges posed by the Palestinian and Iraqi
refugee populations, the arrival of a third refugee
group, namely the Syrians, provides a new, yet
familiar, set of problems for the King’s regime. The
UNHCR reports as of March 13, 2013 state the Syrian
population in Jordan as 289,268.69 Additionally,
according to Jordanian officials, the country spent
$600 million in 2012 supporting Syrian refugees.70
Jordan, which is already battling a budget deficit,
      68 Sufyan Alissa, Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan:
Confronting Socioeconomic Realities, report no. 7 (Washington
DC, United States: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2007), 14,
accessed March 20, 2013,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec4_alissa_jordan_
final.pdf.
      69 "Syrian Regional Refugee Response," UNHCR, last
modified 2013, accessed March 20, 2013,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
      70 "Jordan Reels Over Syrian Refugee Crisis," Al-Jazeera
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claims that the refugee influx causes an enormous
strain on the country’s already meager water, food,
and healthcare supplies.71 Despite its massive size, the
Syrian refugees are relatively new to Jordan, and
comprehensive studies examining this group’s impact
on Jordan have yet to be completed. However, as one
might imagine, Jordan can expect the Syrian element
to pose ethnic, nationalist, and economic challenges
much like its Palestinian and Iraqi predecessors. 
The arrival of the Syrian masses has prompted King
Abdullah to once again rely on his tribal power base,
parliamentary control, and the Mukhabarat. Yet in
dealing with the Syrians, King Abdullah has begun to
demonstrate a clear departure from his treatment of
previous refugee groups in Jordan. Through
Parliament’s past legislation of refugee law, along with
the usual assistance of the Transjordanian citizenry
and the Mukhabarat, King Abdullah has isolated the
majority of the Syrian refugee population in refugee
camps, preventing any interaction that could foment
social unrest in the Kingdom. Pelham notes the shift in
policy towards the Syrian arrivals: “Initially Jordan
followed Lebanon, in allowing refugees to mingle freely
with the local population. But as the influx intensified,
Jordan adopted Turkey’s approach of erecting vast
internment camps […].”72 The largest of the Syrian
      71 Ahmad Khatib, "Syrian Refugees Taxing Jordan's Skimpy
Water Supply," Mother Nature Network, last modified June 1,
2012, accessed March 20, 2013, http://www.mnn.com/earth-
matters/wilderness-resources/stories/syrian-refugees-taxing-
jordans-skimpy-water-supply.
      72 Nicolas Pelham, "Jordan’s Syria Problem," The New York
Review of Books, last modified January 10, 2013, accessed
March 20, 2013,
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refugee camps in Jordan is Zaatri, with a population of
80,000 as of February 20, 2013.73 King Abdullah
recognized that the inherent pitfall of both the
Palestinian and Iraqi refugees was that, once they
moved into cities, it was hard to move them out.
Therefore, the King modified his refugee approach to
preemptively deny urbanization, and isolate the Syrian
population, before they had the opportunity to insert
themselves into Jordanian society. King Abdullah has
publicly stated that the reason for Syrian internment
is to quarantine any arriving Islamists—a group
forming the core of the Syrian resistance
movement—and to prevent the spread of their ideology
to Jordan.74 With Islamist movements winning
democratic elections throughout the Middle East,
including Egypt and Tunisia, King Abdullah is justified
in viewing the group as a legitimate threat to his
regime. 
Playing a large role in the containment of the
Syrians are the Transjordanian “tribal forces” which
are charged with establishing a “buffer zone” along
Jordan’s border with southern Syria, their position
meant to “block the passage of Islamist fighters into
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/jan/10/jordans-
syria-problem/.
      73 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "Syrian Refugees Pour South to
Jordan in Nightly Exodus," Reuters, last modified February 20,
2013, accessed March 20, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-syria-crisis-
border-idUSBRE91J0WU20130220.
      74 Pelham, "Jordan’s Syria Problem," The New York Review of
Books. And for more on the Islamist movement see Line Khatib,
“Syria’s Islamic Movement and the Current Uprising: Political
Acquiescence, Quietism, and Dissent,” Jadaliyya, February 21,
2012. 
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the kingdom.”75 Additionally, King Abdullah has relied
on the Mukhbarat to augment his containment policy
towards the Syrian refugees. Syrians that managed to
avoid internment in the refugee camps, or were
previously in Jordan, live in constant fear of being
rounded-up by the Mukhbarat. One woman even
expressed a fear of taking her children to the park out
of concern that the Mukhbarat might arrest her and
send her to a camp.76 
The Syrian example demonstrates the essence of
King Abdullah’s refugee policy: the use of
parliamentary control, the tribal power base, and the
Mukhbarat to contain and control refugee populations,
and to assure continued monarchial rule, while
simultaneously allowing Jordan to collect international
aid for refugee relief. With Jordan already receiving aid
from the West and from the Arab Gulf States for
refugee support, President Obama’s FY2013 request
for an additional $663.7 million demonstrates the
magnitude of such financial assistance.77 
The practice of playing host to refugee populations
has proven profitable for King Abdullah’s regime. The
flow of cash into Jordan, intended to allay the
economic and infrastructural impact of the refugees,
has most likely been mismanaged along with much of
the government funds in Jordan. In 2010, the Finance
Minister along with a number of top officials were
relieved of their offices amidst an investigation into
      75 Pelham, "Jordan’s Syria Problem," The New York Review of
Books.
      76 Ibid.
      77 Congressional Research Service, Jordan: Background and
U.S. Relations, Doc. No. 7-5700, at 19 (2012). Accessed March
20, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf.
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mismanaged funds that involved a petroleum official,
Ahmed al-Rifa’i, who was related to then-Prime
Minister Samir Rifa’i.78 The officials were characterized
as, “[…] well-connected people, many from
Transjordanian rather than Palestinian origin.”79 Cases
of corruption amongst top Transjordanian government
officials, siphoning funds, much of which were
intended for Palestinian and Iraqi refugee populations,
have only worsened inter-cultural Jordanian relations.
Furthermore, the case of Toujan Al-Faisal
demonstrates King Abdullah’s unwillingness to permit
whistleblowers, and indicates his ambivalence, or even
participation in corruption.80 
It is reasonable to infer, given both the corruption
of King Abdullah II’s regime, and the massive amount
of refugee relief aid managed by the Jordanian
government, that the acceptance of refugee
populations is profitable to the King. The relief aid is
essential to economically pacify his Transjordanian
constituents. A simplified description of King Abdullah
II’s refugee approach can be characterized as follows:
with the corrupt channeling of international relief aid
providing incentive for the acceptance of refugee
populations, the King’s concern for the challenges and
      78 Marc Lynch, "Going after Jordan's Al Capone?," Foreign
Policy, March 10, 2012, accessed March 20, 2013,
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/10/a_rare_crac
kdown_on_corruption_in_jordan.
      79 Ibid.
      80 "'A Sad Day for Freedom of Expression,'" Al-Ahram Weekly
(Cairo, Egypt), May 23, 2002, 587th edition, accessed March 20,
2013, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/587/re7.htm.
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tensions provided by each refugee group has led him
to develop an approach which he has, over time,
adapted in order to mitigate the impacts that refugee
groups have on the kingdom. The Syrians, as Jordan’s
newest refugee group, have elicited a newly adapted
response from King Abdullah resulting in their rigid
segregation from Jordanian society. However, the
King’s strategy of reliance on his tribal power base,
parliamentary control, and the Mukhabarat remain
unchanged in his struggle to maintain his throne.
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